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Sometime in late 2019, President Donald Trump issued a breathtaking 
order. He instructed executive officials to categorically ignore House com-
mittee subpoenas for testimony and materials related to his alleged abuse of 
power.1 The order meant not only that the executive branch would decline to 
cooperate in congressional investigations into the President’s alleged misbe-
havior. It also meant that the executive branch would not even acknowledge 
the legitimacy of those investigations. In fact, the order was so shocking that 
it led to President Trump’s second article of impeachment. 
But while President Trump’s order was stunning enough, it had nothing 
on the President’s reason for issuing the order. The President claimed that 
the congressional committees utterly lacked authority to investigate him.2 In 
particular, the President argued that House committees lacked authority to 
investigate his behavior pursuant to the House’s impeachment authority, be-
cause the full House did not validly authorize an impeachment investigation. 
But at the same time, the President claimed that the House committees lacked 
authority to investigate him pursuant to the House’s legislative power, be-
cause they already cited the House’s impeachment authority, and they could 
not go back and switch out. 
In short, the Administration claimed that when Congress turned one of 
its powers on (impeachment), it automatically turned off another (oversight). 
I will call this the “on-off theory” of congressional authority. 
The on-off theory is remarkable for several reasons. For one, it builds 
on premises that cut against the text, judicial interpretations, and history of 
congressional authorities. It says that congressional authorities are distinct 
and mutually exclusive; that they operate in silos; and that Congress, in 
* Professor of Law, The University of Illinois Chicago Law School. Many thanks to University Distin-
guished Professor Mark Rosen for inviting me to participate in this symposium. And thanks to the staff 
of the IIT Chicago-Kent Law Review for their outstanding editorial work on this piece. All errors are, of 
course, my own. 
 1.  See infra note 12. 
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turning one authority on, necessarily turns another off. It says that when Con-
gress cites its impeachment power, its committees necessarily lose their 
oversight authority. 
Yet the text, judicial interpretations, and history of congressional au-
thorities show just the opposite. Congressional authorities overlap, are mu-
tually reinforcing, and are symbiotic. Congress can operate under one 
authority, or many. And it can use its authorities for different purposes. To 
put a sharper point on it, Congress could use its oversight authority to inves-
tigate, then use the fruits of the investigation for impeachment. Nothing in 
the Constitution forbids this. Indeed, forbidding it would do serious damage 
to our system of checks and balances, in particular to Congress’s ability to 
check the executive branch. 
For another, the on-off theory, now formally adopted by the executive 
branch, sets an important precedent for future impeachments and beyond. 
That is because in our system of separation of powers, we place “significant 
weight upon historical practice.”3 In other words, we count presidential prac-
tices as a standard for future Presidents, especially when the coordinate 
branches validate, or even merely acquiesce in, those practices. Here, the 
Senate affirmatively validated President Trump’s order, and his reasons for 
it, by acquitting him of the second article of impeachment, for obstruction of 
Congress. (It is not yet clear that the Senate majority fully understands the 
consequences, and irony, of this.) The episode now stands as a precedent for 
presidential behavior in future impeachments, and even presidential behavior 
in mine-run congressional oversight investigations. 
We can therefore expect the on-off theory of congressional authority to 
do serious and lasting damage to Congress’s powers to check and balance 
the coordinate branches, and, more generally, to our separation of powers. 
Congress is already at a comparative disadvantage in relation to the President 
in seeking to enforce its own oversight and investigation powers. The Trump 
Administration’s general intransigence and noncooperation with congres-
sional oversight has amply demonstrated this. The on-off theory only com-
pounds this problem. 
In this article, I will first trace the brief history of the House Commit-
tees’ subpoenas, and the Trump Administration’s refusal to comply. I will 
then examine the Administration’s reasons for noncompliance. Finally, I will 
explore some of the problems with those reasons, and with the on-off theory 
of congressional authority. 
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I. BACKGROUND
On September 24, 2019, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi announced at a 
press conference that “the House of Representatives is moving forward with 
an official impeachment inquiry” into certain behavior by the President.4 She 
said that she was “directing . . . six Committees to proceed with” several pre-
viously pending “investigations under that umbrella of impeachment in-
quiry.”5 Speaker Pelosi’s announcement did not relate to the Mueller 
Investigation; instead it related to the complaint filed with the Inspector Gen-
eral of the Intelligence Community alleging that President Trump sought to 
pressure Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to investigate Hunter 
Biden’s connection to Burisma.6
Just three days after Speaker Pelosi’s announcement, on September 27, 
2019, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs issued a subpoena to the Sec-
retary of State seeking documents related to the recent conduct of diplomacy 
between the United States and Ukraine.7 In an accompanying letter, the 
chairs of the Committee on Oversight and Reform, the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs wrote that 
their Committees jointly sought these documents “[p]ursuant to the House 
of Representatives’ impeachment inquiry” (but not its legislative oversight 
authority).8 Soon after, the Committees also issued subpoenas to the Acting 
White House Chief of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of En-
ergy, and several others in the executive branch. The Committees issued 
these subpoenas “[p]ursuant to the House of Representatives’ impeachment 
inquiry” and “in exercise of” the Committees’ “oversight and legislative ju-
risdiction.”9
 4.  Press Release, Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, House of Representatives,  
Pelosi Remarks Announcing Impeachment Inquiry (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.speaker.gov/news-
room/92419-0 [https://perma.cc/529R-K4S4]. 
 5.  Id.
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Letter from Eliot L. Engel, Chair, Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Adam Schiff, Chair, Permanent 
Select Comm. on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, and Elijah E. Cummings, Chair, Comm. 
on Oversight & Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, to Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State 1 (Sept. 
27, 2019). 
8.  Id.
 9.  Letter from Elijah E. Cummings, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight & Reform, U.S. House of 
Representatives, Adam B. Schiff, Chairman, Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, U.S. House of 
Representatives, and Eliot L. Engel, Chairman, Comm. on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representa-
tives, to John Michael Mulvaney, Acting Chief of Staff to the President 1 (Oct. 4, 2019); Letter from 
Adam B. Schiff, Chairman, Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, 
Eliot L. Engel, Chairman, Comm. on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, and Elijah E. Cum-
mings, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight & Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, to Mark T. Esper, 
Secretary of Defense 1 (Oct. 7, 2019); Letter from Adam B. Schiff, Chairman, Permanent Select Comm. 
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The White House quickly responded. In a scathing letter, rife with po-
litical allegations, White House Counsel Pat Cipollone sent a letter on Octo-
ber 8, 2019, to Speaker Pelosi and the three chairs, arguing that their 
impeachment inquiry was “constitutionally invalid.”10 Cipollone argued that 
the investigation was flawed, because the House did not specifically author-
ize it, because the investigation “violate[d] fundamental fairness and consti-
tutionally mandated due process,” and because the investigation was 
motivated by politics.11 According to the letter, the Administration would 
decline to cooperate or participate in the investigation, and President Trump 
would not permit executive branch officials to comply with the Committees’ 
subpoenas.12
Later that same month, on October 31, 2019, the House adopted Reso-
lution 660, which “directed” six committees “to continue their ongoing in-
vestigations as part of the existing House of Representatives inquiry into 
whether sufficient grounds exist for the House of Representatives to exercise 
its Constitutional power to impeach Donald John Trump, President of the 
United States of America.”13 The Resolution also authorized procedures for 
impeachment proceedings before the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
ligence and the Judiciary Committee.14
The targets of the subpoenas ultimately declined to comply. The Com-
mittees nevertheless continued their investigations, and the House passed 
Articles of Impeachment against President Trump.15 The second article 
charged the President with obstruction of Congress for ordering executive 
branch officials not to comply with the Committees’ subpoenas, among other 
things.16
As the impeachment moved to the Senate for trial, the Department of 
Justice Office of Legal Counsel formally advised the White House that the 
Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, and Eliot L. Engel, Chairman, Comm. on Foreign Affairs, U.S. 
House of Representatives, to Gordon Sondland, U.S. Ambassador to the Eur. Union 1 (Oct. 8, 2019); 
Letter from Eliot L. Engel, Chairman, Comm. on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Adam 
B. Schiff, Chairman, Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, and Elijah 
E. Cummings, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight & Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, to James Rich-
ard “Rick” Perry, Sec’y of Energy 1 (Oct. 10, 2019). 
 10.  Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House 
of Representatives 2–3 (Oct. 8, 2019). 
11.  Id. at 1–3. 
 12.  Id. at 7 (“Consistent with the duties of the President of the United States, and in particular his 
obligation to preserve the rights of future occupants of his office, President Trump cannot permit his 
Administration to participate in this partisan inquiry under these circumstances.”). 
 13.  H.R. 660, 116th Cong. § 1 (2019). 
 14.  Id. § 4. 
 15.  H.R. 755, 116th Cong. (2019). 
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Committees’ subpoenas were invalid.17 The OLC opined that the full House 
did not authorize the Committees to investigate impeachment, that House 
Resolution 660 did not retroactively authorize the Committees to issue the 
subpoenas, and that the Committees did not have authority under House 
Rules to issue the subpoenas in furtherance of oversight.18 The OLC con-
cluded that, because the subpoenas were invalid, President Trump could not 
be guilty of obstruction of Congress for ordering executive branch officials 
not to comply with them.19
The very next day, on January 20, 2020, President Trump filed his Trial 
Memorandum in the Senate. The Memorandum recited the exact same argu-
ments that the OLC posed in its own advice to the White House.20
The Senate voted to acquit President Trump of the second article by a 
vote of 47 to 53.21
II. ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE AND ARGUMENTS
The Trump Administration claimed that the Committees’ subpoenas 
were invalid because the Committees lacked authority to issue the subpoe-
nas.22 The two-part argument went like this: (1) the Committees did not have 
authority to issue the subpoenas under the House impeachment power, be-
cause the full House did not formally authorize the Committees to initiate 
their impeachment investigations; and (2) the Committees did not have au-
thority to issue the subpoenas under the House oversight authority because 
their investigation was really designed to advance impeachment, not over-
sight. Thus lacking authority, the Committees could not issue the subpoenas, 
the subpoenas were therefore invalid, and President Trump’s orders not to 
comply with them, by definition, could not constitute obstruction of justice. 
This section recounts those arguments in detail, with an emphasis on 
point (2), which is, after all, the topic of this article. As described above, the 
Administration offered these same arguments in three key documents—
White House Counsel Pat Cipollone’s letter to Speaker Pelosi and the Com-
mittee chairs; the Office of Legal Counsel’s opinion on the House Commit-
tees’ Authority to Investigate Impeachment; and the Trial Memorandum of 
 17.  House Committees’ Authority to Investigate Impeachment, 44 Op. O.L.C. , at *1 (Jan. 19, 
2020). 
 18.  Id. at 3–4, 40. 
 19.  Id. at 52–53. 
 20.  Trial Memorandum of President Donald J. Trump 37-43 (Jan. 20, 2020). 
 21.  166 CONG. REC. S938 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2020). 
 22.  President Trump never formally invoked executive privilege as a reason why the subpoenas 
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President Donald J. Trump for President Trump’s impeachment trial in the 
Senate. Of the three, the OLC memo provides by far the most detail, so this 
section draws principally on the OLC memo. 
A. The Committees Did Not Have Authority Pursuant to Their Im-
peachment Power 
The Trump Administration first claimed that the Committees lacked au-
thority under the House’s impeachment power, because (1) the full House 
had to specifically authorize the Committees to commence impeachment in-
vestigations, (2) it did not, and (3) its after-the-fact efforts to authorize were 
insufficient.23
First, the Administration claimed that the full House had to specifically 
authorize an impeachment inquiry. The starting point for this argument was 
the text. The Administration claimed that because the Constitution vests the 
“sole Power of Impeachment” in the House (and not in a committee or other 
subdivision of the House), the full House had to specifically authorize an 
impeachment inquiry in order to empower a committee to investigate im-
peachment.24 The Administration claimed that “[a] House resolution author-
izing the opening of an impeachment inquiry plays a highly significant role 
in directing the scope and nature of the constitutional inquest that follows.”25
It explained: “Such a resolution does not just reflect traditional practice. It is 
a constitutionally required step before a committee may exercise compulsory 
process in aid of the House’s ‘sole Power of Impeachment.’”26 According to 
the Administration, anything short of a full House vote would result in an 
impermissible delegation of authority, and an invalid investigation. 
The Administration turned next to historical practice.27 It argued that 
“[t]he House has expressly authorized every impeachment investigation of a 
President, including by identifying the investigative committee and author-
izing the use of compulsory process.”28 Moreover, “[t]he same thing has 
been true for nearly all impeachment investigations of other executive offi-
cials and judges.”29 According to the Administration, “[m]ost significantly, 
 23.  See generally House Committees’ Authority to Investigate Impeachment, 44 Op. O.L.C. ___ 
(Jan. 19, 2020). 
 24.  Id. at *2 (“For precisely that reason, the House itself must authorize an impeachment inquiry, 
as it has done in virtually every prior impeachment investigation in our Nation’s history, including every 
one involving a President.”). 
 25.  Id. at *11. 
 26.  Id. at *11 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5). 
 27.  Id. at *20–39. 
 28.  Id. at *20. 
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during the impeachments of Presidents Nixon and Clinton, the House Judi-
ciary Committee determined that the House must provide express authoriza-
tion before any committee may exercise compulsory powers in an 
impeachment investigation.”30
The Administration argued that the other branches have also hewed to 
this line, at least implicitly. As to the executive branch, the Administration 
said that prior Presidents, going back to President Washington, have distin-
guished between Congress’s legislative authority and its impeachment au-
thority.31 The Administration claimed that this demonstrated that prior 
Presidents have insisted that the House formally authorize impeachment be-
fore they had to comply with impeachment-related inquiries.32 As to the ju-
diciary, the Administration pointed out that the courts have acknowledged 
that congressional committees, when engaged in oversight investigations, act 
only with the authority delegated by the full house.33 The Administration 
claimed that this same principle holds, and maybe with even greater force, 
in the context of impeachment.34
Second, the Administration argued that the full House did not formally 
authorize an impeachment inquiry. The Administration pointed to House 
Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s statement at a press conference that “the House of 
Representatives is moving forward with an official impeachment inquiry.”35
It argued that the Speaker alone could not authorize an impeachment inquiry, 
because, in short, “the House Rules do not give the Speaker any authority to 
delegate investigative power.”36
Finally, the Administration argued that the House’s attempt to subse-
quently authorize the Committees to investigate impeachment only after they 
issued their subpoenas did not, in fact, authorize those subpoenas. In partic-
ular, the Administration argued that House Resolution 660 “was entirely pro-
spective” and did not “ratify any previously issued subpoenas or even make 
any mention of them. Accordingly, the pre-October 31 subpoenas, which had 
not been authorized by the House, continued to lack compulsory force.”37
 30.  Id. at *17. 
 31.  Id. at *14–16. 
 32.  Id.
 33.  Id. at *17–20. 
 34.  Id.
 35.  Id. at *1 (quoting Press Release, Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, House of Representatives,  
Pelosi Remarks Announcing Impeachment Inquiry (Sept. 24, 2019), www.speaker.gov/news-
room/92419-0 [https://perma.cc/529R-K4S4]). 
 36.  Id. at *3. 
 37.  Id. at *3–4. The OLC noted “[t]his opinion memorializes the advice we gave about subpoenas 
issued before October 31,” and that the Office “separately addressed some subpoenas issued after that 
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In sum, according to the Administration, the Committees’ subpoenas 
were invalid because the Committees formally issued them under their im-
peachment authority, but “before they had received any actual delegation of 
impeachment-related authority from the House.”38 If the subpoenas were 
valid, then, the Committees had to have issued them pursuant to some other 
authority. The most obvious one—and the one cited by the Committees 
themselves—was the power of oversight. But the Administration impugned 
that one, too. 
B. The Committees Did Not Have Authority Pursuant to Their Over-
sight Power 
The Administration argued that the Committees lacked oversight au-
thority to issue the subpoenas, because the Committees, having purported to 
turn on their impeachment power, necessarily turned off their oversight au-
thority. The argument went like this: (1) the House’s power of impeachment 
is distinct from its power of oversight; (2) the two powers are not inter-
changeable or overlapping, and a committee, without authorization from the 
full House, cannot toggle between the two; and (3) the Committees locked 
themselves into the impeachment power by citing it in the first instance, and 
their attempt to switch to oversight authority was disingenuous and con-
trived. According to the Administration, the Committees, without either the 
impeachment power or the oversight power, utterly lacked authority to issue 
the subpoenas; the subpoenas were invalid; and the President could not have 
obstructed Congress by instructing officials to ignore them. 
The Administration argued first that the House’s power of impeachment 
is distinct from its power of oversight. As the OLC memo opined: 
[T]he House has recognized the fundamental difference between a legis-
lative oversight investigation and an impeachment investigation. The 
House does more than simply pick a label when it “debate[s] and decide[s] 
when it wishes to shift from legislating to impeachment” and to authorize 
a committee to take responsibility for “the grave and weighty process of 
impeachment.” . . . Because a legislative investigation seeks “information 
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or 
change” . . . “legislative judgments normally depend more on the pre-
dicted consequences of proposed legislative actions and their political 
previously issued subpoenas or provide the imprimatur of the House to give those subpoenas legal 
force.”). 
The Administration also argued that House Resolution 430 could not have authorized the Committees’ 
subpoenas because “that resolution did not confer any investigative authority.” Instead, it only granted 
“any and all necessary authority under Article I” only “in connection with” certain “judicial proceeding[s] 
in federal court.” Id. at *46 n.36 (quoting H.R. Res. 430, 116th Cong. (2019)). 
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acceptability, than on precise reconstruction of past events[.]” . . . By con-
trast, an impeachment inquiry must evaluate whether a civil officer did, or 
did not, commit treason, bribery, or another high crime or misde-
meanor . . . and it is more likely than a legislative oversight investigation 
to call for the reconstruction of past events.39
For the Administration, this difference mattered in terms of a commit-
tee’s investigative authority. The Administration argued that because a 
House committee’s power to investigate is restricted by the “controlling 
character” of the committee’s authorization by the full House,40 a committee 
has different powers to investigate, depending on whether it is investigating 
for impeachment, or investigating for oversight. According to the Admin-
istration: 
Both the legislative power and the impeachment power include an implied 
authority to investigate, including by means of compulsory process. But 
those investigative powers are not interchangeable. The House has broadly 
delegated to committees its power to investigate for legislative purposes, 
but it has held impeachment authority more closely, granting authority to 
conduct particular impeachment investigations only as the need has 
arisen.41
And “[b]ecause the House has different investigative powers, establish-
ing which authority has been delegated has often been necessary in the 
course of determining the scope of a committee’s authority to compel wit-
nesses and testimony.”42
Second, the Administration went a step further and argued that the two 
powers are not merely different, they are also entirely distinct, and that a 
committee cannot switch between the two. As the OLC explained, “no com-
mittee may undertake the momentous move from legislative oversight to im-
peachment without a delegation by the full House of such authority.”43 The 
Administration claimed that the full House, through its Rules, authorized 
committees to issue subpoenas “for matters within their legislative jurisdic-
tion.”44 In other words, “[t]he House and Senate do not act in a legislative 
 39.  Id. at *10 (internal citations omitted). The Administration argued moreover that “all three 
branches of the federal government have recognized the constitutional distinction between a legislative 
investigation and an impeachment inquiry.” Id. at *13–14. 
 40.  Id. at *2 (quoting United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 44 (1953)). 
 41.  Id. at *10. 
 42.  Id. at *13. 
 43.  Id. at *2. 
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role in connection with impeachment,” and “[t]he House’s impeachment au-
thority differs fundamentally in character from its legislative power.”45
The OLC acknowledged that House Rules “confer legislative oversight 
jurisdiction on committees and authorize the issuance of subpoenas to that 
end,” but it argued that “they do not grant authority to investigate for im-
peachment purposes.”46 According to the Administration, that is because the 
House Rules do not use the word “impeachment”—they are silent on the 
question. “The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from that silence is that 
the current House, like its predecessors, retained impeachment authority at 
the level of the full House, subject to potential delegations in resolutions tai-
lored for that purpose.”47
Moreover, the Administration claimed that “the House Rules continue 
to reflect the long-established distinction between legislative and non-legis-
lative investigative powers.”48 In particular, the Administration claimed that 
House Rule X addresses only “the legislative jurisdiction of the standing 
committees,”49 and that this authority does not include impeachment author-
ities.50 It claimed that neither Rule XI nor Rule XII expands House commit-
tees’ subpoena powers beyond their jurisdiction in Rule X, because, 
ultimately, Rule X sets the committees’ baseline jurisdiction for the purpose 
of these other rules and authorities.51
According to the Administration, then, the subpoenas were not sup-
ported by the Committees’ power to investigate impeachment. That is be-
cause when the Committees issued their subpoenas, “the House Rules did 
not provide authority to any of those committees to issue subpoenas in con-
nection with potential impeachment.”52 If the subpoenas were valid, they 
must have been authorized by the Committees’ oversight authority. 
But the Administration argued, finally, that the Committees were not 
exercising their oversight authority, despite the Committees’ claim to the 
contrary. In short, the Administration contended that the Committees’ initial 
invocation of the impeachment power locked them into the impeachment 
power, and their subsequent reference to their oversight authority was only 
 45.  Id. at *12. 
 46.  Id. at *40. 
 47.  Id.
 48.  Id.
 49.  Id. at *41. 
 50.  Id. at *42 (“Consistent with the foregoing textual analysis, Rule X has been seen as conferring 
legislative oversight authority on the House’s committees, without any suggestion that impeachment au-
thorities are somehow included therein.”). 
 51.  Id. at *43. 
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an opportunistic and disingenuous attempt to provide cover for their investi-
gations. As an initial matter, the Administration argued that it had author-
ity—indeed, that it had a duty—to second-guess a committee’s assertion of 
authority before responding to any request from a committee.53 But the OLC 
went on to say that the Committees’ “token invocation” of their oversight 
authority was merely cover for their true purpose, to “compel the production 
of information to further an impeachment inquiry.”54 The OLC seemed to 
argue that the Committees’ reference to their oversight authority was not 
sufficiently independent of their reference to their impeachment authority, 
that it was not sufficiently robust, or that it was not sufficiently detailed, and 
therefore the Administration did not need to take it seriously.55
OLC was gracious enough to say that should a congressional committee 
issue a subpoena “in the bona fide exercise of their legislative oversight ju-
risdiction” the Administration would evaluate it “as part of the constitution-
ally required accommodation process” and “consistent with the long-
standing confidentiality interests of the Executive Branch.”56 But in the end, 
While the House committees could have sought some information relating 
to the same subjects in the exercise of their legislative oversight authority, 
the subpoenas they purported to issue ‘pursuant to the House of Repre-
sentatives’ impeachment inquiry’ were not in support of such oversight. 
We therefore conclude that they were unauthorized.57
In sum, the Administration claimed that the House’s authority over im-
peachment was different and entirely distinct from its oversight authority; 
that a House committee could not toggle between the two, at least without 
authorization from the full House; and that the Committees, having locked 
themselves into their impeachment authority, could not alternatively issue 
subpoenas under their oversight authority. Ultimately, the Administration 
claimed that because the Committees lacked authority to issue the subpoe-
nas—under either their impeachment power or their oversight authority—
the President’s order to executive branch officials not to comply with the 
subpoenas could not constitute obstruction of Congress. 
 53.  Id. at *47–48. Among other claims to support this argument, the OLC wrote, “To the contrary, 
a threshold inquiry that should be made upon receipt of any congressional request for information is 
whether the request is supported by any legitimate legislative purpose.” Id. (quoting Response to Con-
gressional Requests for Information Regarding Decisions Made Under the Independent Counsel Act, 10 
Op. O.L.C. 68, 74 (1986)). 
 54.  Id. at *48. 
 55.  Id. at *48–49 (“Apart from their token invocation of ‘oversight and legislative jurisdiction,’ the 
letters offered no hint of any legislative purpose. . . . Absent [authority by the full House to initiate an 
impeachment investigation], the committee chairs’ passing mention of ‘oversight and legislative jurisdic-
tion’ did not cure that fundamental defect.”). 
 56.  Id. at *48. 
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III. PROBLEMS WITH THE ON-OFF THEORY OF CONGRESSIONAL 
AUTHORITY
The Administration’s sweeping and novel arguments leave much to cri-
tique. But in this article, I will focus on just three areas. First, the Admin-
istration misunderstands the way congressional authority works. Next, the 
Administration’s claims about Congressional authority are not supported by 
the law and historical practice. And finally, the Administration’s claims, now 
validated, at least to some degree, by the President’s acquittal in the Senate, 
could leave Congress with dramatically diminished authority to conduct in-
vestigations across the board. 
A. The Administration Misunderstands How Congressional Authority 
Works 
Contrary to the Administration’s position, congressional authorities are 
not mutually exclusive, such that congressional power under one is neces-
sarily different than congressional power under another. Moreover, they do 
not operate on an on-off switch, such that activating one authority means that 
Congress automatically deactivates another. Instead, congressional authori-
ties overlap, and they reinforce and complement each other. 
If there were any doubt, we need only consult the text of the Constitu-
tion itself, in particular the Necessary and Proper Clause. That Clause gives 
Congress the vast and sweeping authority “[t]o make all Laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, 
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the 
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”58 The Clause, along 
with the conjunctive “and” that connects the various congressional authori-
ties in Article I, Section 8, joins and blends those authorities—and, indeed, 
“all other Powers” of the government—and unifies them. It underscores the 
fact that these authorities overlap, and that they reinforce and complement 
each other. 
The Supreme Court has validated this unified reading of congressional 
authority time and again, since the early days of the Republic. Thus, the 
Court in McCulloch v. Maryland famously held that Congress had authority 
to create a national bank.59 The Court ruled that several of Congress’s enu-
merated authorities, operating together, along with the Necessary and Proper 
 58.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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Clause, empowered Congress to create the bank.60 More recently, the Court 
in United States v. Comstock somewhat less famously upheld a federal law 
that provided for the civil commitment of federal prisoners, who would oth-
erwise be released from prison, as “sexually dangerous persons.”61 The 
Court acknowledged that congressional authorities overlap and complement 
and reinforce each other to empower Congress to enact federal criminal 
law.62 And it held that the Necessary and Proper Clause unifies and magni-
fies those authorities to empower Congress to enact the civil confinement 
law at issue in that case.63 These cases, and many others, show that congres-
sional authorities work together, as a unified and harmonized system of au-
thorities, and not separately. 
And just as congressional authorities work together, so, too, Congress’s 
ancillary powers of oversight and investigation work together. That is be-
cause, as the Court has said, congressional authority to engage in oversight 
and investigation derives from Congress’s various constitutional authorities. 
If the constitutional authorities work together, the derivative powers of over-
sight and investigation must, too. This means that Congress has the power to 
engage in oversight and investigation across its various authorities, includ-
ing authorities in Article I, Section 8, and even its impeachment authorities. 
In other words, Congress could engage in oversight and investigation for the 
purpose of legislation and for impeachment, and vice versa. And nothing in 
the Constitution requires Congress to point to the specific authority it relies 
upon for any particular oversight and investigation. Indeed, such a require-
ment would only undercut the unified and symbiotic way that congressional 
authorities work together. 
All this means that the Committees were well within their authority in 
issuing the subpoenas. Even assuming that the full House did not validly 
authorize the Committees to investigate impeachment,64 under House Rule 
 60.  Id. at 353–54 (“We contend, that it was necessary and proper to carry into execution several of 
the enumerated powers, such as the powers of levying and collecting taxes throughout this widely-ex-
tended empire; of paying the public debts, both in the United States and in foreign countries; of borrowing 
money, at home and abroad; of regulating commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states; 
of raising and supporting armies and a navy; and of carrying on war.”). 
 61.  United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010). 
 62.  Id. at 136 (“And Congress routinely exercises its authority to enact criminal laws in furtherance 
of, for example, its enumerated powers to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, to enforce civil rights, 
to spend funds for the general welfare, to establish federal courts, to establish post offices, to regulate 
bankruptcy, to regulate naturalization, and so forth.”). 
 63.  Id. at 137, 149. 
 64.  This is an outright specious claim, with its own set of problems that are well beyond the scope 
of this paper. But I cannot help pointing out the most head-spinning one: it turns the House’s “sole power 
of impeachment” entirely inside out by allowing the President, not the House, to determine how the House 
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X the Committees had all the authority they needed to issue the subpoenas. 
That Rule establishes the jurisdiction of House committees, and authorizes 
them broadly to engage in oversight “[i]n order to determine whether laws 
and programs addressing subjects within the jurisdiction of a committee are 
being implemented and carried out in accordance with the intent of Congress 
and whether they should be continued, curtailed, or eliminated,” among other 
purposes.65 In order to aid committees in their oversight, House Rule XI au-
thorizes committees and their chairs “to require, by subpoena or otherwise, 
the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such 
books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents as it 
considers necessary.”66 The Committees easily could have investigated mat-
ters that were well within their jurisdictions under House Rule X, including 
issues in the impeachment, and to issue subpoenas pursuant to their authori-
ties under House Rule XI. Again, nothing in the Constitution or the House 
Rules required the Committees to name and to stay within their precise au-
thorities. Indeed, everything about the text, judicial interpretations, and his-
tory of the Constitution says just the opposite. 
In short, and contrary to the Administration’s arguments, congressional 
authorities work together, not separately, and they do not operate on an on-
off switch. The text, judicial interpretations, and our history all say that Con-
gress can use its power to investigate for legislative purposes also to advance 
its impeachment power, and, for that matter, vice versa. The Committees’ 
subpoenas were well within the bounds of Congress’s several symbiotic au-
thorities. 
B. The Administration’s Claims Are Not Supported By Law and   
Practice 
Next, the Administration’s claims about congressional authority are not 
supported by judicial interpretations and historical practice by the executive 
branch. Indeed, the Administration’s own cited authorities fall short of its 
sweeping claims. 
As to judicial interpretations, the Administration cites one Supreme 
Court and two lower court cases on congressional oversight authority in sup-
port of its claim that the judiciary has “recognized the constitutional 
 65.  Rules of the House of Representatives, 116th Cong., Rule X(2)(b)(1) (2019). 
 66.  Rules of the House of Representatives, 116th Cong., Rule XI(m)(1)(B) (2019). House Rule 
XI(m)(3)(A)(i) authorizes a committee to delegate “[t]he power to authorize and issue subpoenas . . . to 
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distinction between a legislative investigation and an impeachment in-
quiry.”67 But by the Administration’s own reckoning, these cases only say, 
at most, that congressional authorities to investigate for legislation and to 
investigate impeachment are different, not that they are distinct. These cases 
say nothing about whether a committee might use authorities in a unified 
way, or to toggle between them, in order to support an investigation. 
As to historical practice, the Administration has a similar problem: all 
of the Administration’s examples—from Washington through Jackson 
through Polk—all turn on congressional oversight authority.68 According to 
the Administration, all the referenced Presidents disputed Congress’s author-
ity to investigate a subject in order to advance its oversight authority.69 But 
at the same time, they took the position that Congress might have had au-
thority to investigate the subject if it were engaged in an impeachment.70 But 
by the Administration’s own descriptions, these say, at most, that Presidents 
have understood Congress’s various powers as different. They say nothing 
about whether Presidents have understood Congress’s powers as comple-
mentary. 
In sum, these authorities and examples say, at most, that Congress’s 
various powers are different. That is hardly controversial: of course they are. 
But these authorities and examples cannot support the Administration’s 
much more aggressive claims that Congress’s various powers are distinct, 
and that they operate on an on-off switch. These authorities say nothing of 
that, and they say nothing to take away from the text, judicial interpretations, 
and history that all point to a unified, integrated set of congressional author-
ities, as above. 
C. The Administration’s Claims Could Dramatically Undercut     Con-
gressional Authority 
Finally, the Administration’s sweeping arguments, and its categorical 
refusal to comply with, or even acknowledge the legitimacy of, the Commit-
tees’ subpoenas threaten to do lasting and serious harm to congressional au-
thority across the board. 
 67.  House Committees’ Authority to Investigate Impeachment, 44 Op. O.L.C. ____, *13 (Jan. 19, 
2020) (citing Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1880); Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 940 F.3d 
710, 749 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 
725, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). 
 68.  Id. at 14–16. 
 69.  Id. 
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For one, the Administration’s claims and approach set a dangerous and 
damaging precedent. Remember that in our system, in matters of separation 
of powers, we place “significant weight” on the prior practices of the differ-
ent branches as they relate to each other.71 In particular, the accepted past 
practices of our Presidents become precedent for future presidential actions. 
If we need any reminding of this, we need only recall the many debates 
around President Trump’s impeachment itself—and how those debates al-
most invariably turned on congressional and executive practices in prior 
presidential impeachments. 
Here, the Administration’s claims set a precedent for future Presidents 
that congressional authorities are distinct and disjointed; that congressional 
committees need to point to specific authorization for their investigations by 
their full house; and that Congress and its committees are stuck with the au-
thority they first cite, and cannot use authorities in a complementary way, or 
swap them out once an investigation has commenced. Moreover, the Admin-
istration’s approach sets a precedent for future Presidents that the executive 
branch has authority to judge for itself the validity of Congress’s investiga-
tions, oversight, impeachments, and even other exercises of its authority, and 
that the executive branch can simply ignore congressional investigations that 
it unilaterally deems invalid. These precedents sweep far beyond impeach-
ments; instead, they potentially apply to congressional authority in relation 
to the executive branch in any congressional act of investigation or oversight. 
For another, these precedents are now validated by Congress itself and 
are currently being tested in the courts. As to Congress, the Senate’s vote to 
acquit President Trump reinforces the precedential weight of the Administra-
tion’s sweeping claims. As with President Trump’s impeachment, future 
presidential impeachments will look not only to the President’s behavior, but 
also to the outcome in Congress. If the outcome validates the President’s 
position, as here, it stands as a kind of super-precedent for future presidential 
behavior and future impeachments. 
As to the courts, the en banc D.C. Circuit is now considering a related 
issue, whether former White House Counsel Don McGahn was absolutely 
immune from a subpoena issued by the House Judiciary Committee, and 
whether the courts can even hear this kind of inter-branch dispute.72 A three-
judge panel of the D.C. Circuit ruled in February 2020 that the courts lacked 
 71.  Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 5, 23 (2015) (quoting NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 524 
(2014)). 
 72.  Comm. on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives v. McGahn, 951 F.3d 
510, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2020), vacated sub nom. United States House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 2020 
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jurisdiction over the case, effectively stripping Congress of any serious 
power it had to force compliance with such a subpoena.73  The court reasoned 
that federal courts do not have jurisdiction under Article III to hear disputes 
between Congress and the executive branch, unless those disputes result in 
an injury to a party outside the government.74 The court explained: 
The Constitution does not vest federal courts with some “amorphous gen-
eral supervision of the operations of government.” . . . Instead, as Chief 
Justice Marshall explained, federal courts sit “to decide on the rights of 
individuals” . . . . To that end, we lack authority to resolve disputes be-
tween the Legislative and Executive Branches until their actions harm an 
entity “beyond the [Federal] Government.” Without such a harm, any dis-
pute remains an intramural disagreement about the “operations of govern-
ment” that we lack power to resolve.75
The full D.C. Circuit vacated the ruling and is currently reconsidering 
the case en banc.76 If the full D.C. Circuit ultimately agrees with the three-
judge panel, or if the full court otherwise restricts Congress’s authority to 
enforce its subpoenas directed at executive branch officials in court, the rul-
ing could hinder Congress’s ability to force compliance with its subpoenas 
and, as a practical matter, validate President Trump’s sweeping position that 
the Committees lacked the power to issue and enforce their subpoenas. 
Finally, for a third, absent judicial intervention, there is precious little 
that Congress can actually do to enforce its investigation powers. And that 
is cause for worry in a checks-and-balances system like ours. Professor Van 
Alstyne, in a prescient piece over a half-century ago, explained why: 
Secondly, the power to investigate would appear to be indispensable to the 
maintenance of Congressional independence. Unlike the executive 
branch, Congress has no vast structure of administrative personnel con-
stantly gathering and correlating information and studying the various 
practical problems encountered in the daily administration of governmen-
tal affairs. If Congress were to be denied the power to independently in-
vestigate problems of national scope, it would be largely dependent on the 
executive branch to supply it with the necessary factual justification for a 
proposed legislative program. Detailed information with regard to admin-
istrative policies and the practical operation of statute law would neces-
sarily have to come, for the most part, from those charged with the 
responsibility of formulating such policies and administering such laws. 
Even where the highest good faith is attributed to the executive branch, 
the dangers of such dependence for factual data need no elaboration for 
 73.  McGahn, 951 F.3d at 522. 
 74.  Id. at 515–16. 
 75.  Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
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lawyers who are sensitive to the inadequacies of the fact-finding process 
even in the impartial adversary forum of the courtroom. 
Thirdly, the investigatory power plays an indispensable role as a check 
upon the untrammeled exercise of executive power. The great bulk of spe-
cial investigations have been directed historically at specific functions, ac-
tivities, or individuals in the executive branch. The very possibility that a 
government official may be called to account for his stewardship before a 
Congressional investigating committee undoubtedly exerts a beneficial in-
fluence for more responsible administration. . . . If we are to pay more than 
mere lip service to this basic concept, it would seem clear that Congress 
must retain the power to investigate to determine whether the policies it 
has formulated as the lawmaking agency have been altered or miscon-
ceived in their administration or interpretation by the law executing 
agency.77
As the court noted in McGahn, Congress can, in theory, pressure the 
executive branch into complying with subpoenas by “hold[ing] officers in 
contempt, withhold[ing] appropriations, refus[ing] to confirm the President’s 
nominees, harness[ing] public opinion, delay[ing] or derail[ing] the Presi-
dent’s legislative agenda, or impeach[ing] recalcitrant officers.”78 But in 
practice, these are ineffectual against a defiant administration, like this one. 
The Trump Administration has time and again flatly declined to cooperate 
with congressional oversight and investigation, slow-walked responses, 
evaded inquiries, and generally foot-dragged in an effort to run the clock on 
investigations. This Administration is impervious to congressional attempts 
to check it using traditional tools. For example, this Administration has side-
stepped the Senate’s check under the Appointments Clause by making un-
precedented use of the power unilaterally to appoint “acting” officials.79 It 
has sidestepped Congress’s appropriations power by reprogramming funds 
for pet projects.80 Officials seem to wear congressional contempt as a badge 
of honor. And impeachment seems only to embolden the President. 
In short, the Administration’s response to impeachment is a particularly 
strong reminder that there is little that Congress can actually do to enforce 
its investigation, oversight, and even impeachment powers. 
 77.  Arvo Van Alstyne, Congressional Investigations, 15 F.R.D. 471, 747–75 (1953). 
 78.  McGahn, 951 F.3d at 519. 
 79.  See, e.g., Aaron Blake, Trump’s government full of temps, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/02/21/trump-has-had-an-acting-official-cabinet-level-
job-1-out-every-9-days/ [https://perma.cc/6ZJU-VC6R]. 
 80.  See, e.g., Paul Sonne & Nick Miroff, Pentagon to divert $3.8 billion from its budget to build 
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CONCLUSION
The Administration’s on-off theory of congressional authority says that 
Congress’s various powers are distinct and mutually exclusive; that they op-
erate like silos; and that Congress and its committees cannot toggle between 
them. Yet we know from the text, judicial interpretations, and history of our 
Constitution that this is not right. These sources tell us that Congress’s au-
thorities overlap, that they work together in a symbiotic way, and that Con-
gress can use one authority, or more, for different, but mutually-reinforcing, 
purposes. Still, the Administration’s on-off theory, now on the record and 
validated by the Senate, threatens to do serious and lasting harm to Con-
gress’s authorities to check and balance the coordinate branches of govern-
ment, and, more broadly, to our separation of powers system. 
